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THE MODERNIZATION OF THE FRENCH SECURITIES
MARKETS: MAKING THE EEC CONNECTION
LESLIE A. GOLDMAN
INTRODUCTION
France's status as the fourth largest financial market in the world' ren-
ders crucial its participation in the international effort to globalize securi-
ties markets and harmonize securities regulations. France attained this
prominence in the 1980s, by transforming its Bourse2 from one of the
most highly regulated markets in Europe to one of the most deregulated.'
This liberalization4 occurred in response to both the imminence of the
single European market and the need for France to increase its competi-
tiveness in the international financial arena.-
As France liberalized its markets, it initially failed to institute suffi-
cient "prudential reregulation '6 to keep pace with its "access deregula-
tion."7 Thus, France's securities markets lacked the necessary investor
1. See N. Poser, International Securities Regulation 379 (1991). The first three, in
order, are the U.S., the U.K., and Japan. See id
2. "Bourse" is the term used to describe the French financial markets. In January of
1991, the Paris exchange and the six regional exchanges of Bordeaux, Lille, Lyons, Mar-
seilles, Nantes, and Nancy were merged into a single national market. See Regional Ex-
changes Merge With Paris To Create Single National Equities Market, Int'l Sec. Reg.
Rep., Jan. 28, 1991, at 1. Currently, trading activity and supervision is, for the most part,
centralized in Paris.
Before consolidation, the Paris Bourse handled the largest percentage of all stock ex-
change transactions in France. See Spicer & Oppenheimer, The Spicer & Oppenheimer
Guide to Securities Markets Around the World 42 (1988) [hereinafter Spicer Guide] (not-
ing that the Paris Bourse handled approximately 96 percent of transactions in France in
1988, while the regional exchanges handled the remaining four percent).
3. See N. Poser, supra note 1, at 378 (citing Morgan Guaranty's Jorgan Wagner
Knudsen quoted in Lascelles, Important Transformation, Fin. Times, Nov. 2, 1989, § III,
at VI, col. 1.)
4. "Liberalization" ("liberalisation") is the term often used to describe the abolish-
ing of access restrictions to a financial market. See P. Stonham, Global Stock Market
Reforms 1-3 (1987). Relaxing exchange controls, abolishing fixed broker's commissions
and allowing brokers to participate in market-making activity are just some examples of
"policy liberalization" which have enhanced the "international mobility of capital." Id.
5. See N. Poser, supra note 1, at 379-80; see also 20e Rapport au Prisident de la
R6publique par la Commission des Operations de Bourse 39-41 (1987) [hereinafter COB
1987 Annual Report] (discussing the increasing internationalization of financial markets
around the world and the need to adapt to this phenomenon in order to compete).
6. "Prudential reregulation" refers to measures instituted to provide further protec-
tion to the investor. See Warren, Global Harmonization of Securities Laws The Achieve-
ments of the European Communities, 31 Harv. Int'l L.J. 185, 188 (1990).
7. "Access deregulation" refers to the removal of regulatory barriers, making the
domestic market more accessible to foreigners. See id. at 187. Some commentators have
noted the lagging pace of France's prudential regulation. See, eg., Graham, Paris
Stockmarket" Storming of the Bourse, The Economist, July 22, 1989, at 68 [hereinafter
Storming of the Bourse] ("The regulators have not kept up with the speed of change.');
Lark de Triomphe, The Economist, Jan. 28, 1989, at 77 [hereinafter Lark de Triomphe]
(noting that the Pechiney scandal that occurred in late 1988 showed that the COB, the
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protection and became more accessible and desirable only to those inves-
tors who did not fear the "dirty dealing" traditionally tolerated by the
French government.8 This wrongdoing, specifically insider trading and
market manipulation, might have continued if France had not been sub-
jected to the scrutiny of other, less tolerant countries caused by the grow-
ing number of cross-border transactions.9 In particular, foreigners
became "suspicious of intrigue" after the occurrence, in late 1988, of two
internationally publicized scandals that implicated the French Govern-
ment.' 0 The public concern surrounding these scandals forced France to
adjust its policies in order to gain credibility."
France's "reregulation" followed the example set by Great Britain in
1986, when the British government instituted the Financial Services
Act.12 However, France has not attempted to protect its investors by
adopting a statutory scheme of securities regulation. 3 Instead, the
Bourse's "watchdog agency," has "failed to keep up with the huge growth in France's
financial markets since the mid-1980s").
8. See, e.g., COB's New Governing Board In Place; Members Now at Nine, Int'l Sec.
Reg. Rep., Oct. 25, 1989, at 6 (quoting Beregovoy, France's Finance Minister at the time,
who said that many apparent violations went unsanctioned because they did not fit the
exact description of a punishable offense); Insider Trading Scandals: Parisians React With
a Smirk and a Yawn, Int'l Sec. Reg. Rep., Oct. 11, 1989, at 6 [hereinafter Smirk]
(describing one Parisian shopkeeper's reaction to securities scandals as "a fact of life");
see also Miller, France, in International Capital Markets and Securities Regulation
§ 7.10, at 7-29 (H. Bloomenthal ed. 1982-89) ("countless violations go unnoticed because
the means to enforce criminal sanctions are painfully inadequate").
9. See, e.g., Graham, French Banking Finance and Investment. Buffeted by the
Winds of Change, Fin. Times, Nov. 2, 1989, § III, at I, col. 1 [hereinafter The Winds of
Change] ("the entire structure of France's financial services industry has come to be
driven by forces from outside its frontiers" particularly "from Brussels"); Lever, SEC
Probe Causes Flap in France, Nat'l L.J., Apr. 10, 1989, at 8 ("with the world growing
smaller, insider trading seems to be becoming a more global affair."). This cross-border
scrutiny is best illustrated by the Pechiney scandal. See infra notes 108-16 and accompa-
nying text. During the Pechiney investigation, it was the SEC that forced France's prin-
ciple regulatory authority, the COB, to conduct a thorough investigation and to publish
its results. See Lark de Triomphe, supra note 7, at 77.
10. See Lascelles, Important Transformation, Fin. Times, Nov. 2, 1989, § IIl, at VI,
col. 1.; see also infra notes 108-27 and accompanying text (discussing the Pechiney and
Soci&t6 G~n~rale scandals).
11. See id. (suggesting that France instituted measures to increase investor protection
as a direct result of the Pechiney and Soci6t6 G~n6rale scandals).
12. See N. Poser, supra note 1, at 372. The Financial Services Act ("FSA") sets out
in a single statute the self-regulatory structure of the United Kingdom's securities indus-
try. See generally id. at 91-112 (explaining the Financial Services Act); Note, Inside
Outside Leave Me Alone: Domestic and EC-Motivated Reform in the UK Securities Indus-
try, in Annual Survey of Financial Institutions and Regulation, Transnational Financial
Services in the 1990s, 60 Fordham L. Rev. S285, S289-91 (1992) [hereinafter Reform In
the UK Securities Industry] (same). Among other things, the FSA is designed to protect
investors and to "enhance confidence in the United Kingdom as a clean place to do busi-
ness." N. Poser, supra note 1, at 91.
13. France has no separate legal category for securities laws. See Miller, supra, note
8, § 7.01[l], at 7-5; see also La Grande Boum, The Economist, Oct. 1, 1988, at 83 [herein-
after La Grande Boum] ("In French business law, everything is proscribed unless explic-
itly permitted under the country's legal code."). There are only three printed securities
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French government increased the regulatory authority and the autonomy
of its market "watchdog," the Commission des Operations de Bourse
("COB"). 14
This Note will examine France's recent efforts to improve its competi-
tive position in the international financial community. It will also discuss
the rationale for, and the ramifications of, the recent revamping of
France's regulatory structure. Part I discusses the primary deregulatory
measures instituted by the French government in the 1980s. Part II fo-
cuses on the strengthening of the COB. Part III then explores how this
revamping affects France's ability to implement the European Economic
Community's ("EEC's") radical 5  Investment Services Directive
("ISD"), the final legislative measure needed for completion of a single
European market in banking and investment services." This Note con-
cludes that France is still in the process of reconciling its need for secur-
ing a powerful regulatory structure with the needs of the EEC at large.
I. FRANcE's "BIG BANG": 17 DEREGULATION OF THE BOURSE
Before the reforms of the 1980s, the French Treasury regulated the
Bourse and created an almost impenetrable insular market." The
violations: (1) insider trading, which has been through three substantial revisions since
its enactment in 1970, the last one occurring as part of the August 2, 1989 law; (2) the
dissemination of false or misleading information about an issuer or a publicly traded
security; and (3) market manipulation, which was introduced in the original French pe-
nal code, repealed in 1986, and re-established in 1989 with the insider trading law in
August. The market manipulation law makes it unlawful for anyone with privileged in-
formation to disclose such information outside the normal course of business. See Baum-
gardner, SEC/COB Agreements" The French Perspective, N.Y.LJ., June 21, 1990, at 5,
col. 1, n.18. Unlike the United States, France has no securities fraud provisions. See
Miller, supra note 8, § 7.10, at 7-29. Instead, French law relies heavily on specific texts,
such as regulations issued by the COB, that make such activities illegal. See id.
14. Otherwise translated as the Commission on Stock Exchange Transactions. For a
discussion of the COB's increased regulatory authority, see infra notes 80-85, 92-97, 133-
45, 160-67 and accompanying text.
15. See, e.g., Coopers & Lybrand Europe, European Banking Law 259 (1990) (stating
that the ISD "is the most far reaching piece of Community legislation in the securities
field"); Frustration, Confusion Reign as Policy Deadline Nears, Int'l Sec. Reg. Rep., June
17, 1991, at 4 [hereinafter Frustration, Confusion Reign] (calling the ISD a "liberalizing
measure"); see also Warren, supra note 6, at 187 (stating that the ISD aims at "prudential
deregulation" and is "justified on the basis of laissez faire political policies").
16. See Coopers & Lybrand, Euroscope, Financial Services § 4.7 (1991), available in
LEXIS, Europe Library, Eurscp File [hereinafter Financial Services].
17. London's sudden deregulation that occurred in 1986 is often called the "Big
Bang". See generally N. Poser, supra note 1, at 27-78 (describing the "Big Bang");
Reform in the UK Securities Industry, supra note 12, at S285-87 (1992) (same). France is
said to have launched its own version of London's "big bang." See French Stockmarket
Reform Big Bang Encore, The Economist, Sept. 14, 1991, at 90 [hereinafter Big Bang
Encore]; see also Graham, Foreign Investment Doubles, Fin. Times, Oct. 22, 1990, § III,
at VII, col. 1 [hereinafter Foreign Investment Doubles] (noting that France's reform has
been characterized as a "slavish imitation of London's Big Bang"); Lewis, Foreigners Will
be able to Own French Brokers, N.Y. Times, Mar. 11, 1987, at DI, col. 1. (referring to
France's reforms as "le petit bang" (small bang)).
18. See La Grande Boum, supra note 13, at 83; see also Vilmorin, The Reform of the
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Bourse was under tighter governmental control than were the markets of
any other western European country.' 9 The restrictions on membership,
trading, and the like made the Bourse an undesirable market to trade in
at a time of increasing transnational activity.2"
The French government's particularly restrictive approach to foreign
participation in its markets worsened this situation. For example, the
sale of foreign securities in France,2" and "direct" foreign investment,22
required authorization by the Minister of Finance.23 Moreover, any
transfer of capital in or out of the country required government
authorization.24
Recognizing that the Bourse could not compete in a global economy
without allowing greater access to foreign issuers and investors, and par-
ticularly without the infusion of foreign capital, the French government
set itself to the task of "modernizing" its financial markets.25
The evolution of the French stock market was one of the primary con-
tributors to the Bourse's growth. 26 This evolution involved numerous
French Financial Markets, 407 PLI/Comm 57, 60 (1987) (noting that the traditional
French market was rigid and compartmentalized, and that access to each compartment
was extremely limited and each market was supervised by a different regulatory agency).
19. See N. Poser, supra note 1, at 380. As an example of how restrictive President
Mitterand's government was, in 1981, after Mitterand was inaugurated, Prime Minister
Michel Rocard declared that French residents could only buy foreign stock and bonds
owned by other French residents. See Miller, supra note 8, § 7.25[2], at 7-69. Further-
more, under Mitterand's regime, certain major banks and companies were nationalized.
See Bloomenthal, International Securities, in International Capital Markets and Securi-
ties Regulation § 1.05[5], at 1-53 (H. Bloomenthal ed. 1982-89). The Paris Bourse re-
acted to Mitterand's election within two days by a substantial decrease in shares traded
and a drastic decrease in share value. See id. at 1-53, n.5. By the same token, when
Jacques Chirac's administration came to power in 1986, it quickly set itself to the task of
liberalizing the markets by privatizing the banking industry, abolishing fixed broker's
commissions, and breaking up the long-established broker's cartel. See id. at 1-53 to 1-
54. These reforms had an immediate impact. Before the crash of October 1987, the
number of individual French shareholders tripled. See id. at 1-54; Graham, Bourse Ten-
sions Bubble to Surface, Fin. Times, June 15, 1988, at 4, col. 1.
20. See N. Poser, supra note 1, at 380-81; La Grande Bourn, supra note 13, at 83.
21. See de Mahenge & Persiaux, France Booklet I: Commentary, in International Se-
curities Regulation at 81-82 (R. Rosen ed. 1988) (citing Decree No. 67-78 of 27 January
1967) [hereinafter France Booklet 1].
22. See Vilmorin, supra note 18, at 69. "Direct investment" refers to either the secur-
ing of a controlling interest in a resident company by a direct or indirect purchase, or to
the creation of a branch or enterprise in France. See id. The investment in the company
must exceed 20% in order to be considered a "direct investment." See id.; see also Mazet,
Foreign Investment in French Listed Equity, 407 PLI/Comm 27, 31 (1987) (discussing the
issue of direct investment as an issue of control).
23. The Minister of Finance was the government official responsible for closely regu-
lating the movement of funds in and out of France. See Miller, supra note 8, § 7.25[1], at
7-67.
24. See Miller, supra note 8, § 7.25[1], at 7-67; D6ret N 68-1021, 1968 J.O. 25 Nov.,
11081, D.S.L. 325, at arts. 1, 4, 5. The same authorization requirements applied to
French residents wanting to make direct investments abroad. See Miller, supra note 8,
§ 7.25[1], at 7-67; Deret N 68-1021, supra, at art. 4.
25. See COB 1987 Annual Report, supra note 5, at 40.
26. See N. Poser, supra note 1, at 379; Lascelles, supra note 10, at VI, col. 1.
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changes. Perhaps the most crucial change occurred in 1987, when
France allowed both domestic and foreign financial institutions to
purchase ownership interests in French "agents" (brokers).27 Opening
up market participation to foreign financial institutions" strengthened
the agents' financial base by providing them access to greater amounts of
capital.
2 9
Other major changes took place that directly affected brokers. In
1985, the French government began allowing negotiable rates for bro-
ker's fees in larger transactions.3" Furthermore, agents were permitted to
trade for their own accounts-that is, to underwrite securities, and to
27. See COB 1987 Annual Report, supra note 5, at 45. When this change was first
proposed, the capital of the stock exchange firms was to be opened up gradually: 30% by
1988, 49% by 1989, and 100% by 1990. See iL at 46. The government sped up the
process, however, by allowing outsiders to purchase a 100% interest as early as 1988. See
21e Rapport au President de la Rapublique par la Commission des Oprations de Bourse
4 (1988) [hereinafter COB 1988 Annual Report]; Robert, Director of External Relations
of the Commission des Oplrations de Bourse, Deregulation of the Equity Markets and
Reform of the Stock Exchange in France, Remarks at the New York Stock Exchange, I
(Nov. 9, 1988) (on file at Fordham Law Review) [hereinafter Robert Paper].
28. Agents, the only "members" of the Bourse, were the only persons who could
directly handle transactions on the Bourse. See N. Poser, supra note 1, at 381; Bloomen-
thal, supra note 19, § 1.05[5], at 1-54; La Grande Bourn, supra note 13, at 83. These
privileged few enjoyed a monopoly originally created by Napoleon. See N. Poser, supra
note 1, at 381. Therefore, in a sense, brokers were government servants and had the
protection of the government. See id.; see also COB 1987 Annual Report, supra note 5, at
40 (noting the status of brokers as government officials by virtue of their appointment by
the Minister of Finance).
The number of spaces available for individual agents was limited and these positions
were often passed down from father to son. See N. Poser, supra note 1, at 13; Bloomen-
thai, supra note 19, § 1.05[5], at 1-54. The number was fixed at 60. See id; P. Stonham,
supra note 4, at 129.
In 1988, the government called for the transformation of the "agents de changes" (indi-
vidual brokers) into "Soci&s de Bourse" (incorporated member firms). See COB 1988
Annual Report, supra note 27, at 3. These firms hold the same "traditional brokerage
monopoly" that had been granted to the individual stockbrokers. See Robert Paper,
supra note 27, at 2.
Due to this "legal monopoly," foreign broker-dealers could not make direct transac-
tions on the French market. See Miller, supra note 8, § 7.2512], at 7-68. A foreign com-
pany had to ask a French stockbroker to act for it. Presently, all transactions must still
be made through a Soci&6 de Bourse, which means that those who currently hold inter-
ests in these Soci&6ts have acquired a seat on the stock exchange, not the right to trade
themselves. See Bloomenthal, supra note 19, § 1.0515], at 1-55. This monopoly, however,
will end in 1992 with the integration of the EC markets. See id; N. Poser, supra note 1,
at 384.
29. See Lewis, Foreigners Will Be Able To Own French Brokers, N.Y. Tunes, March
11, 1987, at Dl, col. 1; see also N. Poser, supra note 1, at 382 ("restrictions on ownership
of agents severely limited the amount of capital that was available to them"); COB 1987
Annual Report, supra note 5, at 43 (stating that brokers were handicapped by the tradi-
tional organization of the French markets because they did not have access to a sufficient
financial base).
30. See Spicer Guide, supra note 2, at 47. Fixed commission rates for smaller transac-
tions were not abolished until 1989. See N. Poser, supra note 1, at 384.
31. To "underwrite" is "to assume the risk of buying a new issue of securities from
the issuing corporation or government entity and reselling them to the public, either di-
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"manage portfolios and engage in investment banking."32 This latter
change marked a significant shift in French securities policy. Previously,
an agent could not trade for himself or act as a market-maker, 3 and thus
had to wait for a match to execute a transaction. 4 The illiquidity caused
by this inability to underwrite or to make a market35 naturally drove a
large amount of trading out of the French market and into the British
market. 36
In addition to changes relating to agents, the French government re-
structured the operation of its stock markets. In 1986, France took an
important step in lengthening its trading day.37 Until the mid-1980s,
trading occurred for only two hours, from 12:30 p.m. to 2:30 p.m.38 A
morning session (from 9:30 a.m. to 11:00 a.m.) was finally added in 1986,
and the afternoon session was expanded by one half hour.39 Since 1986,
trading has been expanded even further. The central market now has
continuous trading from 10:00 a.m. to 4:00 p.m.' In this way, the
French have brought the hours of their securities markets more in line
with New York and London.41
Additionally, in 1986, France implemented a modern computerized se-
curities quotation and order matching system called "Cotation Assist6e
rectly or through dealers." Barron's Dictionary of Finance and Investment Terms 491
(3d ed. 1991). The "underwriter" derives a profit "on the difference between the price
paid to the issuer and the public offering price." Id.
32. N. Poser, supra note 1, at 384 (citation omitted). An investment banker "acting
as underwriter or agent... serves as an intermediary between an issuer of securities and
the investing public." Barron's Dictionary of Finance and Investment Terms, supra note
31, at 210. An investment banker also "handle[s] the distribution of blocks of previously
issued securities, either through secondary offerings or through negotiations; maintain[s)
markets for securities already distributed; and act[s] as [a] finder in the private placement
of securities." Id. Other functions of an investment banker include maintaining "broker-
dealer operations, serving both wholesale and retail clients in brokerage and advisory
capacities and offering a growing number of related financial services." Id.
33. To "make a market" means to "maintain firm bid and offer prices in a given
security by standing ready to buy or sell round lots [a generally accepted unit of trading
on a securities exchange] at publicly quoted prices." Barron's Dictionary of Finance and
Investment Terms, supra note 31, at 239.
34. N. Poser, supra note 1, at 382. In other words, a customer had to "rely on the
possibility that the agent would be able to match its buy (or sell) order on the floor of the
Bourse with the sell (or buy) order of another investor." Id.
35. See Bloomenthal, supra note 19, § 1.05[5], at 1-55.
36. See N. Poser, supra note 1, at 382-83.
37. See P. Stonham, supra note 4, at 132.
38. See id.; Foreign Investment Doubles, supra note 17, at VII, col. 1. These trading
sessions were poorly timed because they immediately preceded lunch and brokers would
often leave early. See id. Additionally, brokers had fixed commission rates and enjoyed a
monopoly on the market so there was little incentive to work hard. Cf N. Poser, supra
note 1, at 382 (noting that this monopoly provided agents with a comfortable and reliable
income).
39. See P. Stonham, supra note 4, at 131-32.
40. See Coopers & Lybrand Europe, supra note 15, at 171. For certain stocks, contin-
uous trading is extended until 5:00 p.m. See Graham, Simmering Casseroles Still Need
Attention, Fin. Times, June 30, 1988, at 41, col. 4.
41. See P. Stonham, supra note 4, at 132.
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en Continu" ("CAC").4 2 In 1988, France also began working on a mod-
em electronic system for clearing and paper settlement.43 As a result,
transactions are now settled automatically within a reasonable period of
time.' Under the old clearance system, lengthy delays in settlement or,
in many cases, unsettled transactions were common.45
In 1983, France created a second market for trading in medium-sized
companies that make at least ten percent of their capital shares public.'
On this lightly regulated market, it is easier and less costly for smaller
companies to raise capital than on the main market.4' The second mar-
ket is also available to foreign securities that do not meet the conditions
for registration on the official market.48 In addition, in 1986 the Paris
futures market, the "Matif,"49 began operations at the Bourse." By
1987, a year and a half after its opening, the Matif had already grown to
be the third largest futures market in the world after Chicago and To-
kyo." The Matif is the only French market to closely rival,"2 and even
surpass,53 the volume of activity of its London counterpart.1
The privatization or "de-nationalization" of the banking industry was
42. See COB 1987 Annual Report, supra note 5, at 5, 43; COB 1988 Annual Report,
supra note 27, at 8. By early 1989, most securities were quoted on this system. See COB
1988 Report, supra note 27, at 8.
43. See Graham, Paris Goesfor Speedier Settlement, FIm. Tunes, July 5, 1988, at 31,
col. 5 [hereinafter Speedier Settlement]. The new system is called "Relit" ("Reglement-
Livraison de Titres"). See Foreign Investment Doubles, supra note 17, at VII, col. 2;
Cane, High Yield at the Bourse, Fro. Times, Oct. 5, 1989, § I, at 39, col. 1. It is a complex
computerized system developed by Arthur Andersen & Company. See id.; Graham,
Speedier Settlement, supra, at 25. Relit came into operation on November 16, 1990. See
Rousselle Renews Criticism of EC Investment Services Directive, Int'l Sec. Reg. Rep., Dec.
3, 1990, at 5, 6.
44. See Graham, Speedier Settlement, supra note 43, at 31, col. 5.
45. See id
46. See Coopers & Lybrand Europe, supra note 15, at 172; Touche Ross Int'l, Going
Public in Europe: A Survey of Europe's Second Tier Stock Markets 68-69 (1986) [herein-
after Touche Ross].
47. See Touche Ross, supra note 46, at 68-69.
48. See Coopers & Lybrand Europe, supra note 15, at 172; Touche Ross, supra note
46, at 69. It is easier and less costly to obtain a listing on the second market. See Mazet,
supra note 22, at 42. For example, a company that seeks a listing is required to make
only ten percent of its stock available to the public. See id In addition, no preliminary
audit of the company is required; it is given three years to comply with accounting stan-
dards. See idL; Touche Ross, supra note 46, at 68. Furthermore, companies are not spe-
cifically required to produce a prospectus. See Touche Ross, supra note 46, at 69.
49. Matif is an anacronym for the "Marche i termes des instruments financi6rs."
50. See Loi no. 85-695, 1985 J.O. 12 Juill., 7855, rect., J.O. 13 Juill. 7921, D.S.L 387,
at arts 8-9; COB 1987 Annual Report, supra note 5, at 42.
51. See COB 1987 Annual Report, supra note 5, at 61.
52. See Graham, Matif, Futures Market: A Battle with London, Fin. Times, Oct. 22,
1990, § III, at VIII, col. 2.
53. See N. Poser, supra note 1, at 387 (stating that the Matif surpassed LIFFE in
volume in 1989).
54. The French equities market, on the other hand, still lacks the "sheer size" of the
world's main financial markets, including London's. See Foreign Investment Doubles,
supra note 17, at VII, col. 1; see also Dawkins, Bourse Regulators Back Plan for Reforms,
Fin. Times, July 10, 1991, at 30, col. 8 (noting the relative strength of London's equity
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another factor that contributed to the growth of the Bourse.ss Three
1986 Laws provided for the privatization of sixty-five major French com-
panies and banks.5 6 The privatization movement further broke down the
"cartelised domestic markets" 57 and spurred competition both nationally
and internationally.58
Finally, the Bourse could not have expanded without the willingness of
French financial managers to move toward a more global market.5 9
French banks demonstrated this attitude, in particular, by aggressively
increasing acquisitions abroad." This surge occurred in response to a
recognition that stronger networks are needed to compete across state
borders.61
All of the above-mentioned factors contributed to "internationalizing"
the French markets by abolishing both the club-like, "cliquey" atmos-
phere for which the Bourse was famous, and the red tape that was com-
monly used to constrain foreign investors. Perhaps most significantly,
foreign institutions are now allowed to hold as much as a 100% interest
in a member French brokerage house, and can indirectly participate in
trading and market-making on the Bourse.62 Furthermore, due to the
market in comparison to the Paris equity market, and the strength of London's SEAQ
International, its unparalleled over-the-counter market).
55. See N. Poser, supra note 1, at 379; Lascelles, supra note 26, at VI, col. 1.
56. See Loi n 86-793, 1986 J.O. 2 Juill., 8240, D.S.L. 391, at art. 4; Loin 86-912, 1986
J.O. 7 Aofit 9695, D.S.L. 431, at art. 2; D~eret n 86-1140, 1986 J.O. 26 Oct. 12915,
D.S.L. 522, at art. 5; Coopers & Lybrand Europe, supra note 15, at 48. Prior to these
measures, the French government had nationalized all banks having deposits over one
billion francs (other than those with the status of real estate companies and discount
houses and banks with a majority of non-resident shareholders). See Coopers & Lybrand,
supra note 15, at 48 (citing Act of February 11, 1982).
57. Graham, Creating a Modern System, Fin. Times, Oct. 22, 1990, § 11, at I, col. 1
[hereinafter Modern System]. For an explanation of how the markets were "cartelized,"
see note 28.
58. See Graham, Voracious Appetite for Acquisitions, Fin. Times, May 9, 1990, at 24,
col. 4 [hereinafter Voracious Appetite].
59. Cf N. Poser, supra note 1, at 379 (stating that the "entrepreneurial spirit of
French financial managers" contributed to the development of Paris into a major finan-
cial center during the 1980s); Lascelles, supra note 26, at VI, col. 1 (listing the "new
aggressiveness" of French financial managers as a factor which helped transform Paris
into a "financial centre of considerable importance").
60. See, Voracious Appetite, supra note 58, at 24, col. 4. Companies felt compelled to
expand, and searched for the "critical mass thought necessary to compete." Id. To men-
tion just a few of the more ambitious acquisitions in the past three to four years, the
French company Saint Gobain bought the U.S. abrasives and industrial ceramics com-
pany, Norton, for $1.9 billion, see id.; the second-largest state owned bank, Credit Lyon-
nais, expanded by acquiring banks in Belgium, the Netherlands and Italy, see The Winds
of Change, supra note 9, at I, col. 1, and Pechiney, SA, a French aluminum company
acquired the American National Can company for $1 billion. See Voracious Appetite,
supra note 58, at 24, col. 4.
61. See The Winds of Change, supra note 9, at I, col. 1.
62. See N. Poser, supra note 1, at 383. A leading Paris broker estimated that 30% of
the French equity turnover in 1990 was handled by foreign-owned brokers. See Waters,
Level Playing Fields may not be Open to All-Comers, Fin. Times, Feb. 14, 1991, § III, at
3, col. 5.
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lifting of foreign exchange controls63 and the relaxation of government
authorization requirements, more and more foreign companies are being
quoted on the Bourse." The growth in the presence of foreign securities
and of foreign banks has strengthened the international character of the
Bourse.65
II. THE DEVELOPMENT OF PRUDENTIAL REGULATION
France's recently developed securities regulatory system parallels
those of the United Kingdom and the United States.66 Like these coun-
tries, France relies heavily on self-regulation, "in which a government
agency and one or more self-regulatory organizations each have their re-
spective regulatory functions. 67
A. The Regulatory Authorities
Three groups are primarily responsible for overseeing France's finan-
cial markets-the Commission des Operations de Bourse,"' the Conseil
des Bourses de Valeurs ("CBV"),6 9 and the Soci6t6 des Bourses Fran-
9aises ("SBF'). °
The COB, the government agency chiefly responsible for regulating
the French securities markets, was modeled after both the SEC and the
Belgian equivalent, known as the Commission Bancaire Beige or the Bel-
gian Banking Commission.7' It was created by a Government "Ordon-
nance" in 1967 to enhance the growth of France's securities markets,'
and to ensure the truth and accuracy of information distributed to the
investing public.7 3 At the time of its creation, the COB was not intended
to be the 'market watchdog' that it is today. 4
As originally formed, the COB's "College," or board, consisted of five
members.7" The COB's president was appointed by Decree of the Coun-
63. The last of the foreign exchange controls were lifted in 1990. See Voracious Appe-
tite, supra note 58, at 24, col. 4.
64. See Lascelles, supra note 10, at VI, col. 4; see also Foreign Investment Doubles,
supra note 17, at VII, col. 1 (stating that, according to the COB's statistics, there were
223 foreign listings on the Bourse and 608 domestic listings).
65. See Lascelles, supra note 10, at VI, col. 1; Foreign Investment Doubles, supra note
17, at VII, col. 1.
66. See N. Poser, supra note 1, at 386.
67. Id.
68. See supra note 14.
69. Otherwise known as the Stock Exchange Council.
70. Otherwise known as the Stock Exchange Companies.
71. See France Booklet I, supra note 21, at 14.
72. See Miller, supra note 8, § 7.01[11, at 7-4 (citing Ordinance 67-833 of September
28, 1967).
73. See Ordonnance no 67-833, 1967 J.O. 28 Sept. 9589, D.S.L 373 [hereinafter COB
Ordonnance]; France Booklet I, supra note 21, at 14; Vilmorin, supra note 18, at 64-65.
74. See Baumgardner, supra note 13, at 6, col. 1.
75. See COB Ordonnance, supra note 73, at art. 2; France Booklet 1, supra note 21, at
14; Miller, supra note 8, § 7.01, at 7-4.
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cil of Ministers. 76 The other four members were usually market profes-
sionals chosen by the Minister of Finance based on their ability in law or
finance and economics."
In addition to having a government-appointed Board, the COB was
(and continues to be) financed by the French Government. 78 As France
has modernized its markets over the last seven years,79 the COB's budget
has grown tremendously. In 1985, the COB had ninety-nine employees
and a budget of approximately thirty million francs (approximately five
million U.S. dollars).8 0 Now, the COB receives seventeen million dollars
annually and has a staff of 210 employees.8 ' These figures make its re-
sources proportionately comparable to the support provided by the
United States Government to the SEC. 2
Not surprisingly, this increase in general staff has led to an increase in
investigators" 3 -one of the factors that allowed the COB to conduct sev-
enty-nine investigations in 1990 alone, fifteen of which were eventually
turned over to prosecutors.84 In contrast, from 1983 through 1988, the
COB had conducted a total of only 350 investigations, and turned over
only thirty for prosecution. 5
Prior to the reforms of the late 1980s,86 the COB's enforcement powers
were extremely limited. The agency had jurisdiction over only those
76. See France Booklet 1, supra note 21, at 15. The Council of Ministers is the central
governing body in France, over which the President of the French Republic presides. See
V. Spitzer, The French Constitution, Constitutions of the Countries of the World -
France, art. 9, at 25 (A. Blaustein & G. Flanz eds. 1988). The Council issues decrees in
areas not within the exclusive authority of Parliament, see id. arts. 34-38, at 32-34, the
primary legislative body. See id. art. 34, at 32-33. These decrees deal with the practicali-
ties of implementing the laws passed by Parliament. See id.
77. See COB Ordonnance, supra note 73, at art. 2; France Booklet I, supra note 21, at
15.
78. See France Booklet I, supra note 21, at 15.
79. See supra notes 17-64 and accompanying text.
80. See Baumgardner, supra note 13, at 7, n.17; l8e Rapport au Pr6sident de la R-
publique par la Commission des Op6rations de Bourse 146 Annexe III (1985). This con-
version is based on an exchange rate of 6 French francs to the U.S. dollar.
81. See Greenhouse, An Old Club Transformed, N.Y. Times, July 23, 1991, at D6,
col. 4 [hereinafter An Old Club Transformed].
82. See id. While the SEC's resources are ten times greater than the COB's, the U.S.
market is more than ten times the size of the Bourse. See id. According to an SEC Staff
Attorney in the New York regional office, the SEC had almost 2400 staff members and an
annual budget of approximately $187 million dollars for the 1991 fiscal year. Telephone
interview with Daniel R. Robbins, SEC Staff Attorney, Division of Enforcement at the
New York Regional Office (Nov. 27, 1991) [hereinafter D. Robbins Interview].
83. In 1988, the COB had only eight investigators, see Baumgardner, supra note 13,
at 7, n.22, who concentrated on insider trading and other illegal activities. By December
1988, according to the COB annual report of that year, there were 17 investigators. See
COB 1988 Annual Report, supra note 27, at VII. The report also indicated that this
number was insufficient. See id. By 1990, the number of investigators had reached 45.
See Baumgardner, supra note 13, at 7, col. 3.
84. See An Old Club Transformed, supra note 81, at D6, col. 5.
85. See Baumgardner, supra note 13, at 6, col. 2.
86. See infra notes 92-97, 132-47 and accompanying text.
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companies offering stock to the public, either on the organized stock ex-
change or by way of public offering, s 7 and it could only investigate irreg-
ularities in the information disclosed by those corporations.8 " Moreover,
the COB could issue "General Decisions," "Recommendations, .... In-
structions," "Opinions," and "Notices,"8 9 but could not issue sanctions
or enjoin violations.9' Thus, the COB had to hope for voluntary compli-
ance or refer the matter to a public prosecutor. 91
In 1988, the French Government passed a law strengthening the
COB's role in assuring the accuracy of information disseminated to the
public.92 This law broadened the COB's oversight responsibilities by ren-
dering the Commission responsible for the proper functioning of the
Bourse and the Matif.93 The 1988 law also granted the COB greater
power to investigate illegal activity and to obtain documents necessary to
its investigation,94 as well as the power to impose sanctions on parties
who failed to cooperate with ongoing investigations.9 Furthermore, the
87. See id; COB Ordonnance, supra note 73, at art. 1. A company is considered
"public" when (1) it is listed on an organized exchange, (2) it uses banks, stockbrokers
or other institutions in order to sell its securities, (3) it advertises to sell its securities or
(4) its securities are "widely held in the public". Mazet, supra note 22, at 40.
88. See Miller, supra note 8, § 7.23[1][a], at 7-63 to 7-64. The information which
must be disclosed by a public company includes such items as a prospectus, a balance
sheet, financial reports, materials disseminated about an offering, etc. See Miller, supra
note 7, § 7.05[2], at 7-15.
89. See Mazet, supra note 22, at 38; Miller, supra note 7, § 7.23, at 7-63 to 7-64.
General Decisions are subject to the approval of the Minister of Finance and are as au-
thoritative as statutory law. These General Decisions relate to "general matters with
respect to the functioning of securities exchanges." Mazet, supra note 22, at 38. Such
general matters include, for example, rules on tender offers, disclosure requirements, and
transfers of a controlling interest in a company. See COB Ordonnance, supra note 73, at
art. 3. Recommendations, which are not subject to the government's approval, appear in
the COB's monthly bulletin and are less authoritative than General Decisions. See
Mazet, supra note 22, at 38. The primary function of Recommendations is to "promote
standards to better inform shareholders and the public." See Miller, supra note 7, § 7.23,
at 7-64. Instructions, which also appear in the monthly bulletin, inform issuers on mat-
ters such as where to list their securities and whether a company must clear a prospectus
before a public offering. See iL Opinions express the views of the COB on various issues
of law and have no binding effect. See id; Mazet, supra note 22, at 38. Notices, which
are either published by the press or by the COB in its monthly bulletin, have two pur-
poses. One is to publicize information that listed companies willfully fail to publicize.
The other is to draw the public's attention to "certain risks often relating to so called
diversified financial products." Mazet, supra note 22, at 38.
90. See Miller, supra note 7, § 7.23, at 7-63.
91. See id. at 7-61 to 7-63. The COB transfers a case to the public prosecutor when it
believes that all the elements of an offense can be proved. See id. The prosecutor will, at
its discretion, take the case through a normal criminal court proceeding. If convicted, the
perpetrator will usually receive a fine rather than a prison sentence. See Lightburn, In-
sider Trading in France, 7 Int'l Fin. L. Rev. 23, 25 (Jan. 1988).
92. See Loi n 88-70, 1988 J.O. 23 Janv., 1111, 4 A.L.D. 133, at arts. 13-15 [hereinaf-
ter 1988 Law]; Robert Paper, supra note 27, at 6.
93. See 1988 Law, supra note 92, at arts. 12, 16; COB 1987 Annual Report, supra
note 5, at 63.
94. See 1988 Law, supra note 92, at art. 13; Robert Paper, supra note 27, at 6.
95. See 1988 Law, supra note 92, at art. 15; Robert Paper, supra note 27, at 7.
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1988 Law re-introduced penalties for market manipulation96 and ex-
panded the definition of insider trading to include transactions involving
futures contracts. 97 The 1988 law also modified the structure of the regu-
latory system by establishing the CBV and the SBF.98 Unlike the COB,
which has broad regulatory powers over all the French markets, these
two self-regulatory groups are only responsible for the stock exchange. 99
The CBV, a twelve-member group,"°° is specifically responsible for the
regulation and discipline of the Soci&6ts de Bourse,' 0 ' and for drafting
rules on the functioning of the stock exchange."2 These draft rules re-
ceive final approval from the Minister of Finance upon the advice of the
COB.
103
The SBF, for its part, gains its power from the CBV. 1o The CBV has
delegated to the SBF the authority to supervise and control the market's
administration, security, development, and promotion. 0 5 The SBF also
acts as a clearing house for transactions between stockbroker firms.106
B. The Scandals of 1988 and Their Significance
Although at the time an effort was being made to increase investor
protection schemes, two scandals in 1988 proved that the COB's author-
96. See Robert Paper, supra note 27, at 11. A provision prohibiting market manipu-
lation had been repealed in 1986. See id. The fines for market manipulation, re-imposed
by the 1988 law, are the same as those for insider trading. See id. The offender may
receive a prison sentence of up to two years or fines from 6,000 francs (approximately
$1,000) to 5 million francs (approximately $800,000-$850,000). See id. at 10.
97. See id.; 1988 Law, supra note 92, at art. 16.
98. See COB 1987 Annual Report, supra note 5, at 44-45; Robert Paper, supra note
27, at 2.
99. See, eg., COB 1987 Annual Report, supra note 5, at 44-45 (describing the author-
ity of the CBV and the SBF over the stock exchange); Robert Paper, supra note 27, at 2
(describing the CBV as the "self-regulatory organization supervising the seven French
stock exchanges" and the SBF as the "specialized financial institution" responsible for
the "day-to-day operation of the stock market").
100. See COB 1988 Annual Report, supra note 27, at 4; 1988 Law, supra note 92, at
art. 5. Ten of the members represent the Soci6t6s de Bourse, one represents the listed
companies on the Bourse, and one is chosen by the employees of the SBF and the Soci6t6s
de Bourse. See COB 1988 Annual Report, supra note 27, at 4; Robert Paper, supra note
27, at 3.
101. See France Booklet I, supra note 21, at 12-13; Robert Paper, supra note 27, at 3.
102. See COB 1988 Annual Report, supra note 27, at 5; 1988 Law, supra note 92, at
art. 6; Robert Paper, supra note 27, at 3.
103. See COB 1988 Annual Report, supra note 27, at 5; France Booklet I, Supra note
21, at 11.
104. See COB 1988 Annual Report, supra note 27, at 5.
105. See COB 1988 Annual Report, supra note 27, at 5-6; COB 1987 Annual Report,
supra note 5, at 45. The SBF acts as a liaison between the CBV and the Soci6t6s de
Bourse in that it defines for the Soci&6ts the methods of applying the rules created by the
CBV. See COB 1988 Annual Report, supra note 27, at 5-6. It also instructs companies
on listing procedures. See id. at 5. When a company wants to be listed on the stock
exchange, the SBF collects the necessary information from that company and produces a
report to submit to the CBV. See id.
106. See COB 1988 Annual Report, supra note 27, at 5-6; N. Poser, supra note 1, at
389; Robert Paper, supra note 27, at 4.
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ity and independence were still inadequate. These scandals threatened to
undermine France's progress toward becoming an emerging financial
center. 0 7 The first scandal to receive public attention was the Pechiney
scandal. In November 1988, Pechiney, SA, a state-owned French alumi-
num company, announced a $125 billion takeover of Triangle Industries,
an American can-packaging company.108 In the weeks before the an-
nouncement, the SEC noticed that between 200,000 and 300,000 shares
of Triangle Industries stock had been traded at an average of roughly ten
dollars a share. At the time of the announcement, the stock was trading
at fifty-six dollars a share." 9 Moreover, the SEC informed the COB that
one-third of the orders for Triangle stock had originated from France."10
The COB, in its report, indicated that six French investors were involved
in insider trading."' This group included a close friend of President Mit-
terand's, as well as a "top contributor" to the Socialist party. 112
Because it was common in France to sweep such scandals "under the
rug,"' I" it was widely believed that the SEC was the driving force behind
the COB's surprisingly active investigation into the Pechiney scandal and
the COB's public disclosure of that scandal." 4 The SEC, in fact, sent
107. See Lascelles, supra note 10, at VI, col. 3; Baumgardner, supra note 13, at 7, col.
3; Greenhouse, Modest Insider-Trading Stir is a Huge Scandal in France, N.Y. Tunes,
Jan. 30, 1989, at Dl, col. I [hereinafter Huge Scandalj.
108. See Lever, supra note 9, at 8, col. 1; Huge Scandal, supra note 107, at DI, col. 1.
109. See Lever, supra note 9, at 8, col. 1; Graham, Paris Tennis Club Among Links
Noted in Report on Pechiney Insider Dealing Racket, Fn. Times, Feb. 1, 1989, at 2, col. 4.
110. See Baunmgardner, supra note 13, at 6, col. 6. In fact, the SEC reportedly in-
formed the COB that friends of Mitterand's may have known about the purchase offer in
advance. See Lark de Triomphe, supra note 7, at 77; see also Huge Scandal, supra note
107, at D1, col. 2 ("the scandal became public only after the Securities and Exchange
Commission asked European officials for help in uncovering who was behind the surge in
trading in Triangle stock").
111. See COB 1988 Annual Report, supra note 27, at 60; A Pungent French Tale of
Socks and Shares, The Economist, Feb. 4, 1989, at 43 [hereinafter A Pungent Tale].
112. See A Pungent Tale, supra note 111, at 43; Huge Scandal, supra note 107, at D9,
col. 1. The "close friend" of Mitterand's refers to Roger-Patrice Pelat, a "retired execu-
tive who knows Mr. Mitterand from their days together in a German prisoner of war
camp." Huge Scandal, supra note 107, at D9, col. 1. The "top contributor", A Pungent
Tale, supra note 111, at 43, refers to Max Th6ret, a "prominent Socialist business execu-
tive." Huge Scandal, supra note 107, at D9, col. 1.
113. Lever, supra note 9, at 8; Baumgardner, supra note 13, at 6, col. 6; see also
Lightburn, supra note 91, at 25 (suggesting that the "slap on the wrist" nature of punish-
ment in insider trading cases demonstrates that insider trading is not yet taken seriously
by the judiciary). For example, in 1987, one of France's largest banks, Paribas, allegedly
used insider information to sell large blocks of stock in a company in which it held a
majority of shares. Immediately thereafter the company published huge losses. See id
The scandal was barely noticed, although it was referred for prosecution. See id Like-
wise, after hearing evidence of a scandal involving the purchase of shares of Thomson-
CSF immediately before Thomson entered into a very sizable contract with Saudi Arabia,
the court dismissed the case despite strong circumstantial evidence, on the grounds that
the Prosecutor had not proven "beyond a reasonable doubt" that defendants had knowl-
edge of the contract and had no prior trading history concerning the stock. See id.
114. See Lever, supra note 9, at 8; Baumgardner, supra note 13, at 6, col. 6; Huge
Scandal, supra note 107, at D9, col. 1.
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two of its investigators to France to help the COB's investigation of the
affair.1" 5 Even with this assistance, however, the COB took almost two
months to generate a report on the scandal.11 6
The second scandal, following on the heels of the Pechiney affair, in-
volved the Soci6t6 G6n6rale, one of France's largest banks. In 1988, the
Conservative government, which lost power later that year, had priva-
tized the Soci6t6 G6nerale.1 7 According to the current French govern-
ment, the problem began when Conservatives reserved control of the
bank for some of their political supporters.Is A group of Socialist busi-
nessmen, encouraged by the former French Finance Minister, attempted
a raid on the Bank in early 1989.119 Although the takeover bid was un-
successful, the raiders shared a profit of about $100 million.'20
The COB at first did not find this coup attempt unethical'21 and did
not continue its initial investigations until February 1989, after having
already begun its investigations with the SEC into the Pechiney scan-
dal. 122 One reason for the COB's reluctance to pursue an investigation
was that, at that time, the COB was tightly controlled by the Finance
Minister, who admitted to being indirectly involved in the affair.123
The Pechiney and Soci6t6 G6n6rale scandals marked a turning point
for France as an international market, because they received a tremen-
dous amount of publicity both nationally and internationally. 124 These
scandals caused the French government so much embarrassment that it
approved a 1989 law, known as the "Law on Security and Disclosure in
the Financial Markets," within six months of its proposal.' 25
115. See Baumgardner, supra note 13, at 7, n.38.
116. See COB 1988 Annual Report, supra note 27, at 60 (noting that the COB recog-
nized the gravity of the situation and decided to issue its report to be publicly disclosed
by the government on January 31, 1989).
117. See A Pungent Tale, supra note 111, at 43.
118. See id.
119. See Graham, French Bourse Watchdog on New Trail, Fin. Times, Feb. 3, 1989, at
2, col. 5 [hereinafter New Trail].
120. See A Pungent Tale, supra note 111, at 43.
121. See id. The COB, in fact, at first refused to open a formal inquiry into the Soci6t6
G6n6rale affair, even though the bank itself had indicated cause for suspicion and the
Industry Minister had called for an investigation. See New Trail, supra note 119, at 2,
col. 5.
122. See New Trail, supra note 119, at 2, col. 5; A Pungent Tale, supra note 111, at 43.
123. See, eg., New Trail, supra note 119, at 2, col. 5 (reporting admission of Finance
Minister to having encouraged the raid as part of a political strategy to diminish the
economic power retained by the former right-wing government); Graham, French Dis-
cover Indirect Evidence ofInsider Trading, Fin. Times, Feb. 1, 1989, at 1, col. 7 (reporting
that the French Ministry "[was] known to have been informed" before the raid by the
French financier, Georges Pebereau).
124. See, e.g., Smirk, supra note 8, at 6 (noting that many books were written about
both scandals); Huge Scandal, supra note 107, at Dl, col. I (noting that the Pechiney
scandal "ballooned into a huge scandal that is shaking the [French] Government" and
that the conservatives were criticized for having "dragg[ed] the image of France and its
Bourse through the mud by playing up the scandal[s]").
125. See Graham, Storming of the Bourse, supra note 7, at 68; see also Baumgardner,
supra note 13, at 7, col. 1 (while the scandals were still being investigated, the French
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Moreover, the Pechiney scandal revealed the need to grant the COB
authority comparable to its foreign counterparts. 126 While the COB and
the SEC jointly investigated this affair, the COB lacked statutory power
to investigate on behalf of a foreign regulatory body and was, therefore,
criticized by members of the French government. 127 This lack of author-
ity stemmed from the protectionist French Blocking Statute of 1980,
which prohibited any person from seeking or communicating commer-
cial business information from French sources for use in foreign judicial
or administrative proceedings. 28
Another limitation on the COB's jurisdiction was its authority to in-
vestigate only those companies that publicly offered their securities on
the French markets. 2 9 This limitation proved problematic when foreign
intermediaries were involved. Assuming these intermediaries did not
publicly offer their stock on the French markets, the COB had no author-
ity to investigate their records. 3
In response to the Pechiney and Soci6t6 G6n6rale scandals, and to
solve both the COB's jurisdictional problems and the general insuffi-
ciency of the COB's authority,1 3 1 the government passed the "Security
and Disclosure" Law of August 2, 1989.132
C. A More Powerful Watchdog
Among other innovations, the Security and Disclosure Law changed
the structure of the COB. The COB college now consists of nine mem-
bers, and is headed by a chairperson appointed by the French cabinet for
one six-year term.1 33 Six of the remaining eight members are nominated
by various governmental and judicial bodies and by the French stock
exchange."M These six members, in turn, select the final two members
Finance Minister announced that he would create new legislation to strengthen the
COB). The "Security and Disclosure" law is discussed infra at notes 132-48 and accom-
panying text.
126. See COB 1988 Annual Report, supra note 27, at 60.
127. See Baumgardner, supra note 13, at 7, col. 4, n.37; Lever, supra note 9, at 8.
128. See Baumgardner, supra note 13, at 5, col. I & n.27 (citing Law No. 80-358 of
July 16, 1980). Although this statute imposed criminal penalties for violations, its pur-
pose was to protect French nationals from having to comply with overseas discovery
procedures such as those in the United States. See id. at 5, col. 1 & n.28. The Blocking
Statute, however, left room for certain exemptions, such as international agreements. See
Loi n 80-538, 1980 J.O. 17 Juill., 1799, D.S.L. 285, at art. 2.
129. See Baumgardner, supra note 13, at 6, col. 4.
130. See Miller, supra note 7, § 7.25, at 7-70. This limitation proved particularly prob-
lematic in the Pechiney affair because Swiss, Luxembourg, Lebanese and Caribbean
banks all acted as intermediaries to place orders for anonymous clients. See Lever, supra
note 9, at 8.
131. See Baumgardner, supra note 13, at 7, col. I.
132. See Loi N 89-531, 1989 J.O. 4 Aofit 9822, D.S.L. 264 [hereinafter Law of August
2, 1989]. The law is subtitled the Law on Security and Disclosure in the Financial Mar-
kets. See Baumgardner, supra note 13, at 7, col. 1.




based upon the candidates' professional expertise. a" Thus, the COB's
college is now made up of market professionals instead of well connected
government appointees. 1
36
Under the Security and Disclosure Law, the COB can now impose
fines up to 10,000 million francs, or ten times the amount of profit,
whichever is greater.1 37 Not even the SEC has this immense sanctioning
power. 138
Furthermore, the Security and Disclosure Law grants the COB au-
thority to search any private or public premises, 139 and to question sus-
pects"4 when investigating such matters as insider trading, false
information dissemination, or manipulation of exchange rates.' 4' The
COB may also impound any documents relating to an investigation, after
obtaining approval of the Tribunal de Grande Instance, and, if accompa-
nied during a search by an "Officer of the Judicial Police.' 42 Once a
search has been conducted, the COB may then request the Tribunal to
issue an order to seize property (including funds) or to issue an injunc-
tion.'4 3 The new law also allows the COB to request that the Tribunal
freeze assets, temporarily suspend persons from their professions, and
place funds in escrow until the proceeding is over.'"
Additionally, the Security and Disclosure Law authorizes the COB to
conduct investigations of securities violations at the request of foreign
counterparts, and to disclose information to foreign regulators.' 45 The
COB had been negotiating a cooperation agreement with the SEC since
1985, realizing the necessity of foreign cooperation for the Bourse's
transnational activities.'4 6 Although the two agencies did agree in prin-
ciple to assist each other, a formal agreement was not signed until De-
135. See id.
136. See supra text accompanying notes 76-77.
137. See Law of August 2, 1989, supra note 132, at arts. 9-2, 1, 2.
138. See Baumgardner, supra note 13, at 7, col. 1. The SEC's sanctioning power is
limited to three times the profit made, or losses avoided, by the insider trading. See D.
Robbins Conversation, supra note 82.
139. See Law of August 2, 1989, supra note 132, at art. 4.
140. See id. at art. 2.
141. See id. at art. 4. To search premises, however, the COB must obtain authoriza-
tion from the "President du tribunal de grande instance," a Court of original jurisdiction,
in the jurisdiction in which they are searching. See Mercadel, Regional Developments:
France, 24 Int'l Law. 817, 818 (1990).
142. See Law of August 2, 1989, supra note 132, at art. 4; Mercadel, supra note 141, at
818. The officer of the judicial police is the authority charged with monitoring this type
of search. See Law of August 2, 1989, supra note 132, at art. 4.
143. See Law of August 2, 1989, supra note 132, at art. 5.; Mercadel, supra note 141, at
818.
144. See Law of August 2, 1989, supra note 132, at art. 5.
145. See id. at art. 3.
146. See U.S. French to Sign Accord Aimed at Reducing Secrecy Obstacles, 20 Sec. Reg.
& L. Rep. (BNA) 1552, 1552-53 (1988) [hereinafter BNA Report of Oct. 14, 1988]. The
COB had acknowledged the need for foreign cooperation for more efficient policing of
these matters. See COB 1988 Annual Report, supra note 27, at VII.
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cember 1989,"4 after both the occurrence of the Pechiney affair and the
enactment of the Security and Disclosure Law granting the COB statu-
tory authority to enter into such agreements. 148 In contrast to this cur-
rent autonomy, at the time of the Pechiney and Soci&6 G6n6rale
scandals, the COB could only turn these cases over to the Minister of
Justice for prosecution.149
The COB's 1989 agreement with the SEC was the first such coopera-
tion agreement with a foreign counterpart."5 0 Signed on December 14,
1989, it calls for the two regulatory authorities to provide mutual assist-
ance with investigations.151 Further, it attempts to alleviate problems in
detecting cross-border fraud, as in the Pechiney scandal. 52 Specifically,
it was created to formalize cooperation between France and the United
States on a wide range of enforcement matters, including the protection
of investors against "inadequate disclosure, insider trading, manipulation
and failure of market professionals to carry out their responsibilities."'153
On the same date, December 14, 1989, the SEC and the COB also
signed what is referred to as an "Understanding."'" This Understand-
ing goes beyond the first Agreement, because it provides for consulta-
tions between the two regulatory authorities to reconcile the differences
in their approaches to securities regulation.'
In addition, between 1989 and October 1991, the COB began negotiat-
ing exchange of information agreements with countries other than the
United States.'56 Some of the COB's more recent negotiations involved
its counterparts in Canada, Switzerland and Mexico.' 57 Furthermore,
147. See Baumgardner, supra note 13, at 6, col. 6.
148. See Law of August 2, 1989, supra note 132, at art. 3; 22e Rapport au President de
la R6publique par la Commission des Opations de Bourse 77 (1989) [hereinafter COB
1989 Annual Report].
149. See Greenhouse, France Seeks More Power for Its S.E.C, N.Y. Times, Mar. 9,
1989, at Dl, col. 6; Huge Scandal, supra note 107, at D9, col. 3.
150. See Baumgardner, supra note 13, at 5, col. 1.
151. See Note, International Securities Enforcement Cooperation Act and Memoranda
of Understanding, 31 Harv. Int'l L.J. 295, 306 n.70 (1990). The bilateral agreements
between the SEC and its foreign counterparts are termed Memoranda of Understanding
("MOU"). See id. at 305; see also Note, Outside Investors A New Breed of Insider Trad-
ers?, in Annual Survey of Financial Institution Regulation, Transnational Financial Serv-
ices in the 1990s, 60 Fordham L. Rev. S319, S344-45 (1992) (discussing the SEC's MOUs
with various countries).
152. See Baumgardner, supra note 13, at 7, col. 2.
153. Baumgardner, supra note 13, at 7, col. 2.
154. This agreement is formally known as the "Understanding Regarding the Estab-
lishment of a Framework for Consultations between the Securities and Exchange Com-
mission and the Commission des Op&ations de Bourse". Id at 7, cal. 3.
155. See ia at 5, col. 1.
156. To demonstrate the importance of these agreements, over half of the investiga-
tions conducted by the COB in 1990--that is, forty out of seventy-five-had overseas
implications. See More Than Half of Investigations Involve Foreign Business COB Says,
Int'l Sec. Reg. Rep., July 1, 1991, at 3.
157. See COB to Negotiate Information Pacts with Mexican. Australian Regulators,
Int'l Sec. Reg. Rep., Sept. 23, 1991, at 1. These agreements specifically allow the two
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the COB co-drafted a set of ethical principles with London's regulatory
body, the Securities and Investment Board ("SIB").1" 8 These ethical
principles focus specifically on the relationship between financial in-
termediaries (that is, banks and investment firms) and their clients.1 59
In March 1990, the COB ensured that its newly enhanced policing
authority would not go unnoticed, when it proposed new requirements
pertaining to "insider trading, market manipulation, and reporting of fi-
nancial information."' 6 In May 1990, the Finance Minister approved
these proposed regulations. 161 The new regulations generally provide for
more stringent transparency requirements 62 and offer a clearer definition
of insider trading. 16 The new regulations also include a measure known
as "rescrit," which allows a company to determine if its future actions
will gain COB approval by consulting with the COB prior to implemen-
tation of its plan. 16' If, at that time, the COB determines that a com-
pany's plans comply with the COB's guidelines, it generally grants
written approval.1 65 This prior approval operates to protect the corn-
authorities to exchange information with each other. See id. They are similar to the
information agreement between the COB and the SEC. See id. at 10.
158. See COB Joins with U.K.'s SIB to Adopt Common Ethical Code, Int'l Sec. Reg.
Rep., Mar. 26, 1990, at 6.
159. See id. These intermediaries must (1) have the resources necessary to properly
perform and supervise their activities in compliance with the regulatory system; (2) sup-
ply customers with all necessary information when dealing on their behalf; (3) apply
fairness and diligence in their relationship with clients; (4) take steps to avoid conflicts of
interests; and (5) promote integrity and transparency in accordance with the require-
ments of the market in which they are dealing. See id.
160. N. Poser, supra note 1, at 388; see 23e Rapport au Pr6sident de ]a R6publique par
la Commission des Operations de Bourse 87 (1990) [hereinafter COB 1990 Report].
161. See COB Draws Up Tougher Insider Trading Rules, Int'l Sec. Reg. Rep., May 21,
1990, at 2 [hereinafter COB Draws Rules].
162. See COB 1990 Report, supra note 160, at 87. Thus, the COB now requires that
listed companies publish "exact, precise, sincere" information on any fact that would
affect the share price, as soon as that fact becomes known to the company. See Annexes,
R6glement n 90-02, 1990 J.O. 20 Juill., 8600, D.S.L. 344, at arts. 2, 4. Moreover, the
published information must be as complete as the information filed abroad. See Id. at art.
7. The new regulations also provide guidelines for what information with respect to listed
securities must be publicly disseminated. See id. at arts. 4-8.
163. See COB 1990 Report, supra note 160, at 95-97; Annexe, R6glememt N 90-08,
1990 J.O. 20 Juill. 8602, D.S.L. 345, at arts. 1-6. The new rules forbid insiders-who
include the following: (1) corporate managers and staff; (2) dealers and other personnel
involved in the preparation and execution of an order; (3) people receiving privileged
information through their work; and (4) anyone receiving such information from people
in the other three categories-from profiting from the information they have or passing it
on to anyone else. See id. at arts. 2-5. Privileged information includes any non-public
information that may influence the stock price. See id. at art. 1. The original insider
trading law, adopted in 1967 by Ordonnance No. 67-883 of September 28, 1967, only
included directors, officers, and key executives of any publicly traded company and their
spouses in the definition of "insiders". See Lightburn supra, note 91, at 23.
164. See COB 1990 Annual Report, supra note 160, at 102; Annexes, R6glement N 90-
07, 1990 J.O. 20 Juill. 8600, D.S.L. 345, at art. 1.
165. The COB publishes its opinions in its monthly bulletin. See Annexes, R6glement
N 90-07, supra note 160, at art 9.
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pany from incurring subsequent sanctions.166
The new insider trading rule, the last rule to receive approval from the
Finance Minister, allows the COB to impose a civil penalty without hav-
ing to prove fraudulent intent. 167 Although this rule makes sanctioning
semi-automatic, the COB believes that because the boundaries of insider
trading are clearly defined, would-be violators have no excuse for claim-
ing that they either misunderstood the law or had no notice of it.'
61
The COB's new sanctioning power seems to have produced results.
The number of insider trading investigations has increased 169 and, as the
COB's spokeswoman, Marie-Claude Robert, suggests, the COB may
have finally managed to instill fear in would-be violators. 170 Further-
more, by allowing sanctions, the French have found a solution to the "all
or nothing" problem of either prosecuting or allowing the wrongdoing to
be swept under the rug.17 ' Although the number of cases referred to
prosecutors has increased since the passing of the Security and Disclo-
sure Law, 172 only recently did the COB use its power to impose civil
fines. 173
III. TAKING DEREGULATION TO ITS EXTREME: FRANCE AND THE
EEC's INVESTMENT SERVICES DIRECTIVE
The aim of the Investment Services Directive ("ISD"), which has been
166. See Sanctioned to Protect: The COB Has Been Given Greater Powers, Fin. Times,
Oct. 22, 1990, § III, at VIII, col. 6 [hereinafter Sanctioned to Protect].
167. See id. at VIII, col. 6; COB 1990 Annual Report, supra note 160, at 100. This
rule received criticism from the judiciary, which believed that the rule granted the COB
judicial, as well as executive authority. See Sanctioned to Protect, supra note 166, at VIII,
col. 6.
168. See Sanctioned to Protect, supra note 166, at VIII, col. 6.; see also COB 1990
Report, supra note 160, at 100 (stating R6glement N 90-08 draws a clearer line between
permissible and impermissible conduct).
169. Notably, nine of the fifteen cases referred to prosecutors in 1990 were insider
trading cases. See More Than Half of Investigations Involve Foreign Business, COB Says,
Int'l Sec. Reg. Rep., July 1, 1991, at 3. This presents a sharp contrast to the first 22 years
of the COB's existence (1967-1989), in which less than thirty insider trading cases were
passed to prosecutors. See Whelan, Sweeping New French Market Law Alarms Some
Experts, Reuters, Sept. 19, 1989, available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, Busrpt file.
170. See An Old Club Transformed, supra note 81, at D6, col. 5. In this article, Robert
states her belief that there is "less insider trading now because of [the COB's] new pow-
ers." Id. She also believes that the changes have made the COB "much more like the
S.E.C." Id.
171. See Sanctioned to Protect, supra note 166, at VIII, col. 6.
172. In 1990 alone, 15 cases were referred to prosecutors, see An Old Club Trans-
formed, supra note 81, at D6, col. 5, as compared with 30 in the six years between 1983-
1988. See Baumgardner, supra note 13, at 6, col. 4.
173. See Letter from I. Fuzellier, Commission des Operations de Bourse to Joel
Reidenberg, Associate Professor, Fordham University School of Law (November 22,
1991) (enclosing Decision de Sanction d L'Encontre de la S.A. Compagnie Foncire de la
Banque D'Arbitrage et de Cridit, COB Bulletin, N 250, 7-11 (Sept. 1991)) (on file at
Fordham Law Review). In this decision, the COB, citing the 1990 regulations as a source
of its authority, imposed a fine of 800,000 francs (approximately $35,000) on the S.A.
Compagnie Foncibre for insider trading. See COB Bulletin, supra, at 9, 11.
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called the "cornerstone" of Europe's single market, 7 4 is to give member
state investment firms a "European Passport" to freely provide invest-
ment-related services in any EC country. 7 ' A "passport," authorized
by the firm's home state, would obviate the need for further approval in
any member state in which the investment firm chooses to trade or estab-
lish a branch. 17 6 Furthermore, a firm approved by its home state would
be permitted to obtain either direct or indirect membership in the stock
exchange of any EC country.'7 7
The ISD was amended in 1990 to align with the Second Banking Di-
rective, 7 ' which allows banks a similar "passport" to operate in any
member state.' 79 The European Commission intended the ISD to be-
come effective simultaneously with the Second Banking Directive,"' 0 but
it appears that, due to recent controversy, the ISD may not be in force on
January 1, 1993."8l
The ISD has created a division in the EC member states over three
main issues: (1) the public reporting requirements; (2) whether trading
should occur only on regulated markets; and (3) whether banks that
have already obtained clearance in securities should be allowed to par-
ticipate in direct trading on securities markets.1 "2 Two factions or
"camps" have emerged in response to the ISD. 18 3 The French lead one
174. See Investment Services Directive Remains Stalled Among Ministers, Int'l Sec.
Reg. Rep., July 15, 1991, at 2 [hereinafter ISD Stalled].
175. See Amended Commission Proposal for a Council Directive on Investment Serv-
ices in the Securities Field, COM (89) 629, at 588 (Jan. 23, 1990) [hereinafter ISD].
176. See id. at 593.
177. See id. at 610, art. 13.
178. See id. at 588; Financial Services, supra note 16, at § 5.10. For a discussion of the
Second Banking Directive, see Note, Banking on Europe: 1992 and EMU, in Annual
Survey of Financial Institutions and Regulation, Transnational Financial Services in the
1990s, 60 Fordham L. Rev. S395, S400-407 (1992) [hereinafter Banking on Europe].
179. See Warren, supra note 6, at 221; Frustration, Confusion Reign, supra note 15, at
4; see also Banking on Europe, supra note 178, at S400-407 (discussing the Second Bank-
ing Directive).
180. The target date is January 1, 1993. See Financial Services, supra note 16, at § 4.6;
see also ISD, supra note 175, at 593 ("it is necessary for reasons of fair competition, to
ensure that non-bank investment firms benefit from similar freedom to create branches
and provide services across frontiers as that provided for by the [Second Banking Direc-
tive]"); Frustration, Confusion Reign, supra note 15, at 4 (implementation of the ISD is
vital for the Second Banking Directive to achieve its goal).
181. See Proposed Investment Services Directive Continues to Dog EC Finance Minis-
ters; Stalemate Continues, Thomson's Int'l Banking Regulator, Jan. 13, 1992, at 3 [here-
inafter ISD Continues to Dog EC Ministers]; Financial Services: Member States Fail to
Break Deadlock on Investment Services Directive, European Info. Serv.; European Report,
Dec. 17, 1991, available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, Int'l file [hereinafter Member States
Fail to Break Deadlock].
182. See ISD Stalled, supra note 174, at 2; Hill, Investment Services Reach Stalemate in
Brussels, Fin. Times, Mar. 15, 1991, at 29, col. 6.
183. See, e.g., North-South Factional Fight Continues over EC's Investment Services Di-
rective, Thomson's Int'l Banking Regulator, Sept. 20, 1991, at 4 (describing the two fac-
tions) [hereinafter North South Fight]; Setting Europe's Stockmarkets Free, The
Economist, Sept. 7, 1991, at 18 (same) [hereinafter Setting Markets Free].
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camp known as the "Club Med" camp or the "protectionist" group. 1"
The Club Med camp, composed mostly of southern European countries
including France, Italy, Spain and Belgium,185 objects to the liberality of
this directive."8 6 The other camp, lead by Great Britain and termed the
"North Sea Group," urges the full liberalization potential of the ISD. 187
This faction also includes Germany, Ireland and the Netherlands. 8 s
A. France's Specific Objections to the ISD
France views the ISD as discouraging regulation.1 89 The Chairman of
the SBF in France has criticized the Directive for "failing to ensure mar-
ket transparency and basic enforcement."'" Unlike the North Sea
camp, which wants to enhance trading outside the regular markets, the
French want trading to take place on a single, regulated market, believ-
ing that investors need full protection.'9 1
Apart from the politically inspired competition between France and
Great Britain, competition also exists on a very practical economic level.
France has allowed large institutions to trade with each other off the
market only on a matched basis, while London's Stock Exchange Auto-
mated Quotations System ("SEAQ") has been significantly less regu-
lated.' 92 London's SEAQ is the most substantial over-the-counter
184. See, e.g., Johnson, French Put EC Broker Plans in Jeopardy, The Daily Tele., July
9, 1991, City Section, at 18, available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, Int'l File ("the French
lead a group of temperamentally protectionist countries"); Setting Markets Free, supra
note 183, at 18 (the Club Med camp "wants securities to be traded on tightly regulated
markets.... to protect... Europe's other small investors," although the "simpler truth is
that the southern Europeans want to protect their exchanges from competition").
185. See North-South Fight, supra note 183, at 4; Setting Markets Free, supra note 183,
at 18.
186. See infra notes 189-91 & 216-20 and accompanying text.
187. See, e.g., Financial Services, supra note 16, at § 4.7 (noting that the northern
group wants "maximum flexibility and freedom" for investors); Setting Markets Free,
supra note 183, at 18 (commenting that the Northern group wants to minimize rules on
market structure in order to maximize competition).
188. See Financial Services, supra note 16, at § 4.6.
189. See Off-Exchange Trade Compromise Unlikely to Succeed Quickly, Int'l Sec. Reg.
Rep., Jan. 14, 1991, at 4 (France argues that the ISD promotes a "supranational, unstruc-
tured market").
190. European Market Priorities Differ Among Exchange Leaders As 1992 Deadline
Approaches, BNA Int'l Fin. Daily (BNA), May 29, 1991, available in LEXIS, BNA Li-
brary, BNASLD File.
191. See Dawkins, Block Trading Review on the Way, Fin. Times, Sept. 9, 1991, at 19,
col. 4. The French are particularly wary of granting free access to transact "on-market"
to those investment firms that, in other countries, are authorized to trade "off-market."
See Eurupdate, Banking and Financial Services § 7.1.8, available in WESTLAW,
Eurupdate File, WL 11696 (D.R.T.) (1991). France argues that these firms are "inher-
ently less well supervised" and would pose a threat to French consumers. Id. Instead,
France wants to allow authorization to trade off-market only on a case-by-case basis. See
EC Commissioner Seeks Compromises From UK., France On Investment Services Direc-
tive, Int'l Sec. Reg. Rep., Apr. 22, 1991, at 8 [hereinafter EC Commissioner Seeks
Compromise].
192. See Dawkins, Block Trading Review, supra note 191, at 19, col. 5.
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market in Europe. 193 In fact, it controls ninety percent of all cross-bor-
der, off-market activity.'94 Currently, the French have no equivalent to
compete with London's over-the-counter market. Instead, France has a
small, tightly regulated "hors cote" or over-the-counter market for secur-
ities that are not quoted on the official list.195 This market is used for
either small companies or stocks with low trade volumes, and not for
block trading. 96 Thus, France has insisted on limiting trading only to
established, regulated markets.
France is motivated by other concerns as well. Due to the traditional
stockbroker's monopoly, 97 France is reluctant to freely open up mem-
bership to its long-closed Bourse.' 98 In addition, given the scandals that
have permeated the French securities industry, France wants transac-
tions reported to regulatory authorities and wants the reporting to occur
on the same evening as the transaction. 199
In an attempt to satisfy the needs of the opposing camps, compromises
were proposed by the two EC Presidencies2"° in 1991.21 The first came
from the Italian Presidency, which took over the Council of Ministers in
December 1990. The Italian compromise, similar to the compromise
193. See Frustration, Confusion Reign, supra note 15, at 5; Louth, Rivalry, Distrust
Retard EC- Wide Share Market Plan, Reuters, July 18, 1991, available in LEXIS, Nexis
Library, FINRPT File; see also Reform in the UK Securities Industry, supra note 12, at
S313-15 (describing Great Britain's position and the strength of SEAQ).
194. See Frustration, Confusion Reign, supra note 15, at 4; see also Louth, supra note
193, at *2 (reporting that the exact figure in 1990 was 93%).
195. See Coopers & Lybrand Europe, supra note 15, at 172; P. Stonham, supra note 4,
at 141.
196. See Coopers & Lybrand Europe, supra note 15, at 172.
197. See supra note 28.
198. See Frustration, Confusion Reign, supra note 15, at 4; see also France Booklet I,
supra note 21, at 122 (noting that, in France, outsiders will not gain free direct access to
the stock market until 1993 and currently must rely on their "associations" with member
firms).
199. See ISD Stalled, supra note 174, at 2; EC Commissioner Seeks Compromises, supra
note 191, at 8. This requirement is particularly directed at those firms that trade "off-
market." Presently, these traders have 24 hours to report. See Eurupdate, supra note
191, at § 7.1.9.
200. The EC President presides over the European Community's Council of Ministers,
the institution responsible for ensuring that the economic policies of the individual mem-
ber states are reconciled with those of the Community. See Treaty Establishing the Euro-
pean Economic Community in Treaties Establishing the European Economic
Communities, arts. 145-146, at 263-264 (1987) [hereinafter EEC Treaty]. The Council of
Ministers is made up of representatives of the governments of the twelve Member states.
See id. at art. 146. The office of the President rotates among each of the twelve members
of the Council, and is held for a term of six months. See id.
201. The Portugese Presidency, which took over the Council of Ministers in January of
1992, has been working on another compromise, but has yet to resolve the conflict over
the reporting requirements. See Atkins & Hill, UK Plans to Put Brake on Single Mar-
ket; British EC Presidency Under the Conservatives May Put New Legislation in Jeopardy,
Fin. Times, Feb. 10, 1992, at 14, col. 2; see also Member States Fail to Break Deadlock,
supra note 181, at 1 ("The Commission [had been] in close contact with the Portugese in
the hope that the next six months will produce a breakthrough.").
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later proposed by the Dutch Presidency, 2 allowed transactions to be
limited by member states to regulated markets if (1) the investor resided
in the country in which the transaction occurred; (2) the shares involved
were listed in the country imposing the restriction; (3) the relevant in-
vestment firm provided services in that country; and (4) the value of the
transaction was under a certain threshold." 3
The Dutch, in a further effort to save the ISD from complete failure,
offered another compromise.' 4 Like the Italian proposal, the Dutch
plan would essentially have allowed member states to require that trad-
ing occur on regulated markets if certain conditions were met. 5 The
Dutch proposal included only three conditions: (1) the investor must
reside in the country in which the transaction occurs; (2) the investment
firm must operate through either a main office or branch in that country
or under the freedom to provide services there (that is, with a "pass-
port"); and (3) the transaction must involve an instrument that is nor-
mally traded on a regulated market in that country.' s The Dutch
compromise ultimately provided that member states must permit an in-
vestor to trade "off market" if the investor so desires"'° with the stipula-
tion that a member state could make permission conditional upon its
"explicit authorization."" In determining whether to grant authoriza-
tion, the host state would consider the investor's need for protection. 9
Concerned that this solution would encourage investors to flock from
regulated exchanges to private transactions, France rejected the Dutch
compromise." ° Great Britain, for its part, favors no directive over a
watered down version. 11
Other possible solutions have been proposed. One solution, for exam-
ple, recognizes that the North Sea Group is particularly concerned with
promoting block traders or "wholesale investors," while France is con-
202. See infra notes 204-09 and accompanying text.
203. See Off-Exchange Trade Compromise Unlikely to Succeed Quickly, supra note
189, at 4-5.
204. See Investment Services: No Progress-and Threat of no Directive from Dutch Presi-
dency, European Info. Serv.; Multinatl Serv., Aug. 1991, Sept. 1991, § 1I, No. 313, at 8,
available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, ITF file [hereinafter No Progress].
205. See id.
206. See id
207. See ISD Stalled, supra note 174, at 2.
208. See No Progress, supra note 204, at 8.
209. See id
210. See McCune, EC Fails to Agree on Post-1992 Stock Trading Rules, Reuters, July
8, 1991, available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, Intl fie.
211. See, eg., Touted 'Level Playing Field' Looks Uneven as EC Fails to Agree on In-
vestment Services, Thomson's Int'l Banking Regulator, Aug. 30, 1991, at 8 ("T]he advan-
tages of a single investment services passport would be outweighed by the costs of making
concessions in the current areas of disagreement."); Fox, Britain Suggests Dropping EC
Financial Directives, Reuters, Jan. 30, 1992, available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, Intl file
(statement of Paul Tillett of the British Bankers Association) ("We would rather have no
Investment Services Directive at all than to have one which actually inhibited investment
business."); Hill, supra note 182, at 29, col. 6 (British "would rather see the ISD with-
drawn altogether than accept what it claims are protectionist measures by other states").
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cerned with protecting the small investor.212 Thus, if the French could
establish a less-regulated, off-market exchange similar to SEAQ, then the
Directive could mandate trading on organized markets for everyone but
the "wholesale investor." '213 The aim would be to win back those
"wholesale trades" that, in the past three years, have sought London's
SEAQ as their venue.214 A similar proposal suggests that the other point
of contention, the speed of publication after a transaction, could be re-
solved by granting more time for a large trade to be published.2 5
Presently, the conflict surrounding this transparency 216 issue provides
the greatest obstacle to compromise.21 7 France continues to advocate
immediate disclosure of transactions 218 and a "minimum level of price
transparency. ' 21 9 It opposes allowing an exemption to this requirement
for services such as London's SEAQ.220 France claims that in such mar-
kets "the investor is given insufficient details of trading prices and
volumes. 221
Great Britain, however, contends that an instantaneous and detailed
reporting requirement would hinder its market-makers and commodity
brokers who rely on secrecy.222 Great Britain further argues that the
damage this stringent requirement would cause would extend to its entire
"quote-driven" system,223 affecting its more sophisticated markets.224
The EEC's Commission 225 believes the opposing factions await a text
212. See Setting Markets Free, supra note 183, at 20.
213. See id. In fact, the CBV recently published a report that encourages block trading
off the market at privately agreed to prices. See Big Bang Encore, supra note 17, at 92.
214. See Setting Markets Free, supra note 183, at 20.
215. See id.
216. "Transparency" in this context, specifically refers to the "amount and timing of
information that must be disclosed when shares are dealt." UK Says EC Deadlocked on
Single Securities Market, Reuters, Dec. 16, 1991, available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, Int'l
file.
217. See ISD Continues to Dog EC Finance Ministers, supra note 181, at 3; Member
States Fail to Break Deadlock, supra note 181, at * 1.
218. See ISD Continues to Dog EC Finance Ministers, supra note 181, at 3.
219. Waters, Investment Services Directive in Trouble, Fin. Reg. Rep., June, 1991, at 11
[hereinafter ISD in Trouble]. "Price transparency" refers to the provision of precise in-
formation about market prices. See id. This information is intended to help the investor
evaluate the price at which a security is trading. See id.
220. See Investment Services: A Final Dutch Bid to Break the Deadlock?, European




223. Under this system, dealers "buy speculatively and confidentially." Member States
Fail to Break Deadlock, supra note 181, at * 1. On SEAQ, the domestic equity market in
London, the price of large trades are not published until 90 minutes after they occur. See
ISD in Trouble, supra note 219, at 12. This delay gives marketmakers a chance to "reduce
their exposure" before their transaction is revealed to the market. See id. On SEAQ
International, however, details of individual trades are never published. See id. This
practice represents the preference of large investors who use SEAQ International. See id.
224. See Member States Fail to Break Deadlock, supra note 181.
225. The European Commission, which receives its authority from Articles 155-63 of
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that will "guarantee" the preservation of their respective systems.2 6
Keeping in mind the needs of both groups, the Commission has been
working with the Portugese Presidency to produce a new compromise.22'
B. A Justified Resistance?
It is clear that the ISD is aimed at removing regulatory barriers in
order to internationalize securities markets.28 One could argue, how-
ever, that this Directive undermines "prudential regulation" of the sort
recently instituted by France. While the ISD is intended to harmonize
prudential conditions," 9 these conditions may not be as prudent as
France would like.2 0 In the past three years, the French government
has made a concerted effort to promote as much transparency as possible
in its markets, primarily by strengthening the COB."3
It has been argued that France is using this transparency argument to
cover the distrust it harbors toward London and the other members of
the North Sea Camp. 2  The problem France faces, however, cannot
simply be attributed to its historical distrust of those EC states that op-
pose it on this issue.
For one thing, France's securities market is still far behind London's
in size and activity.233 Furthermore, without a loosely regulated over-
the-counter market, France's growth may be stunted as it blends into a
market controlled by Britain and/or Germany under the ISD.? If
France, however, refuses to accept the ISD, it will take the blame for
hindering the goal of European harmonization. 235
EEC Treaty, supra note 200, is the institution from which all EEC legislation originates.
See K-D Borchardt, The ABC of Community Law 19 (1991).
226. See Member States Fail to Break Deadlock, supra note 181, at * 1.
227. See id
228. See supra notes 175-79 and accompanying text.
229. See Coopers & Lybrand Europe, supra note 15, at 249. In fact, in the preamble of
the ISD, the Commission states that the purpose of the adopted approach is to achieve
"the essential harmonization necessary and sufficient to secure the mutual recognition of
authorization and of prudential supervision systems." ISD, supra note 175, at 593.
230. See Off-Exchange Compromise Unlikely to Succeed Quickly, supra note 189, at 5
(explaining the French criticism of the ISD for making no reference to transparency,
setting no minimum standards for reporting on transactions, and providing no guidelines
for the conduct of intermediaries).
231. See supra notes 77-81, 87-91, 126-40 and accompanying text.
232. See Frustration, Confusion Reign, supra note 15, at 4; Louth, supra note 193, at
*2.
233. See supra note 53.
234. Great Britain and Germany, countries in which off-exchange trading abounds,
"stand to gain the most" from ensuring that unrestricted off-exchange continues. See
Louth, supra note 193, at *2. Thus, these countries want the ISD to allow investors the
opportunity to "opt out" of trading on regulated exchanges. See id.
235. Great Britain also argues that, if the French succeed in their demands, customers
will be "deterred from operating on the European market, and could be driven to markets
outside the EC such as Switzerland." Johnson, supra note 184, at 18; see also, Louth,
supra note 193, at *1 ("Non-European firms are frequently put off listing in Europe by
having to choose just one bourse, or face the complexities of listing on several. This is not
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The proponents of the ISD argue that the Directive is crucial to the
successful development of a single European market.236 With the ISD in
force, they argue, investors will no longer have to face the separate regu-
lations of each individual state and, therefore, will be further encouraged
to participate in the EC market. Furthermore, proponents of the ISD
believe that it will be instrumental in preventing a sudden nationalization
movement, both in France and in other EC countries.237
The ISD presents France with the problem of striking a balance be-
tween its regulatory needs as a nation, given the "traditionally lenient
French attitude toward financial scandal, ' 238 and the needs of those
other member states who may have a traditionally stringent attitude to-
ward market corruption. In addition, the ISD demonstrates the need for
member states to institute regulatory measures with the European Com-
munity in mind, rather than as detached, autonomous entities.239
In order for the Bourse to remain competitive and to retain at least
some sense of autonomy, France must reach the point at which the ISD
represents an "opportunity" rather than a "threat" to its securities mar-
kets. In other words, without undermining its recent emphasis on inves-
tor protection schemes, the French Government needs to create a less-
regulated, off-market exchange that can compete with London's SEAQ.
Despite the criticism France has received in the dispute over the ISD,
it would be inaccurate to classify France's reaction as a move toward
nationalism in light of all it has done to internationalize. Rather, it is
self-preservation that understandably keeps the remaining regulatory
barriers in place.
CONCLUSION
France's deregulation occurred as a controlled, step-by-step process in
anticipation of a rapidly approaching single European market. As a re-
sult of this process, however, France realized that liberalization means
not only eliminating access restrictions, but also increasing transparency.
In other words, it could not deregulate without "reregulating." The
most efficient and obvious way for France to promote transparency and,
therefore, integrity, was to mitigate government interference and to in-
stall a watchdog agency "with teeth."
a problem for European companies wanting access to U.S. or Japanese domestic
investors.").
236. See note 174 and accompanying text; see also, Louth, supra note 193, at *1 (stat-
ing that a uniform European market for securities is one of the "lynchpins" of the EC's
"single market drive"); ISD in Trouble, supra note 219, at 11 (referring to the ISD as the
"missing link in the Community's financial services programme").
237. See Setting Markets Free, supra note 183, at 18.
238. Whelan, supra note 169, at *2.
239. See generally Malloy, Bumper Cars: Themes of Convergence in International Reg-
ulation, in Annual Survey of Financial Institutions and Regulation, Transnational Finan-
cial Services in the 1990s, 60 Fordham L. Rev. S1, S1-22 (1992) (discussing the need for a
"converged pattern of regulation" among international regulators).
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While its 1980s liberalization process has turned the imminent single
market into an opportunity for France to expand, France cannot afford
to completely "let loose" and succumb to the pressure to break down all
cross-border barriers. Despite the fact that the French Government's in-
stallation of prudential regulation was expedited as a result of the
Pechiney and Soci6t6 Gfn~rale scandals, this process is still in its early
stages. Once France is confident that it has developed the mechanisms
needed to maintain control of its markets, the French government can
more readily purge the vestiges of its protectionist and nationalistic tradi-
tions and will be better able to participate in those decisions that are
made for the benefit of the EEC at large.

